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Abstract 13 
Solving the water infrastructure gap has become a major policy concern. In rural areas of 14 
Africa, access to water is as much constrained by territorial coverage as by the poor 15 
conditions of water points due to the difficulty in mobilizing the community for repairs. This 16 
paper examines the equity considerations of a rural water and sanitation program in a district 17 
of Mozambique, and their impact on the achievement of the program’s objectives. Our 18 
analysis underlines the contradiction between the conceptualization of equity in the design, 19 
planning and implementation of the program. Even an explicitly pro-poor strategy can fall 20 
short of delivering equity. Our findings stress the fact that overlooking local perception of 21 
equity can have a direct impact on the ability of a community to ensure the maintenance of 22 
their water points. They call for a careful definition of equity in the design of water programs, 23 
as well as closer attention to this criterion as a precondition to achieve the long-term 24 
objective of the program. 25 
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1. Introduction 53 
The fact that equity has become a major policy concern is widely reflected in discourse and public policy 54 
(Wegerich, 2007, Venot and Clement, 2013, Joy et al., 2014), particularly in the water sector, where 55 
access to water is a key lever for poverty alleviation. Although access has improved worldwide in the 56 
last two decades, access to services is still characterized by heterogeneity among countries, provinces 57 
and districts (Andres et al., 2014, Frank and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). In discourse and policy, water 58 
equity is often reduced to equal access to water infrastructure; the water infrastructure gap is particularly 59 
apparent between urban and rural Africa, where most poverty is concentrated. But in rural areas, access 60 
is as much constrained by territorial coverage as by the poor conditions of water points. This paper 61 
analyses the trade-offs between long-term maintenance of boreholes - i.e., their sustainability - and 62 
equity and efficiency during the planning and implementation of a rural water program resulting in a 63 
sense of fairness of the overall undertaking. 64 
To ensure better territorial coverage and long-term maintenance of water points (WPs), the approach 65 
consisting of isolated water projects has often been replaced by the service-delivery approach (SDA) to 66 
rural water and sanitation policies, which aim to set up institutional and management structures able to 67 
ensure long-term water supplies (Lockwood and Smits, 2011, Moriarty et al., 2013). The participation 68 
of the community in planning, as well as in operation and maintenance (O&M), is expected to ensure 69 
ownership and consequently sustainability of the WPs. Decentralization is assumed to facilitate the 70 
flows of information and provide incentives to respond to local needs, and thus increase service delivery, 71 
and indirectly to positively impact poverty alleviation (De Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011, Andres et 72 
al., 2014). These programs are thus advocated as inherently pro-poor. 73 
This paper examines the place and nature of equity considerations in the execution of a water delivery 74 
program with explicit pro-poor objectives in the semi-arid district of Mabalane in Mozambique, where 75 




The issue of equity in water supply programs in rural areas has been mostly addressed by correcting 78 
spatial imbalance (Smith and Hanson, 2003; Zuindeau and Ifresi, 2007), which is usually explained as 79 
the result of shortcomings in the planning, and of bias in decision-making (De Palencia and Pérez-80 
Foguet, 2011, Andres et al., 2014). The National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program in 81 
Mozambique (Portuguese acronym PRONASAR) aimed to improve water coverage and to correct 82 
spatial inequality by improved management procedures in both planning and execution, including in 83 
O&M of the infrastructures by the community. PRONASAR had an explicit pro-poor dimension in 84 
terms of community targets and recommendations for O&M. A framework that differentiates the 85 
distributive, procedural and contextual dimensions of equity, as well as the origin of the equity claims 86 
developed by McDermott et al. (2013), was used to analyze how fairness issues were being dealt with 87 
in a district where water access is restricted by the availability of surface water, the risk of salinity in 88 
subterranean water and high drilling costs. Interviews with the main actors in charge of implementing 89 
the program at different administrative levels was completed by a qualitative survey conducted in 12 90 
communities and a quantitative survey of water users that tackled water access and equity perceptions. 91 
The paper argues that incoherence in the conception of equity and the relationships between actors 92 
during these stages led to the disregard of the equity dimension, which, in turn, impacted the 93 
maintenance of the boreholes. It highlights the limits of SDA, in which the managerial and efficiency 94 
bias jeopardize the long-term objectives of the program. 95 
2. Equity in rural water supply 96 
To analyze equity, we draw on the framework developed by McDermott et al. (2013), which 97 
distinguishes four parameters. It includes defining (1) who sets the goals (e.g. who is included and who 98 
is excluded in the framing), (2) what aims are included in the framing, (3) who counts in the definition, 99 
and finally (4) how it is defined around its three dimensions (distributive, procedural and/or contextual) 100 
(Pinto and McDermott, 2013) 101 
The distributive dimension deals with the allocation and distribution of water and its benefits among 102 
different users. But water distributive equity can be assessed against different principles, such as equal 103 
rights and equal shares, as well as in proportion to inputs or efforts and in proportion to needs or the 104 
overall consequences to society. A strong equalitarian norm often prevails in rural Africa (Platteau, 2006, 105 
D’Exelle et al., 2012). It applies not only to the distribution of material outputs, but also to their costs, 106 
including symbolic ones such as village unity or social prestige (Cochran and Ray, 2009). These 107 
principles can be combined, by distinguishing between horizontal and vertical equity: horizontal equity 108 
refers to equal treatment of equal - or “universal access” - while vertical equity measures the extent to 109 
which individuals or a community with unequal needs are considered (McIntyre and Gilson, 2002, 110 
Wegerich, 2007). 111 
Addressing geographic disparities is part of distributive equity. In water service, it has traditionally been 112 
dealt with by minimizing the distance between users and WPs (Smith and Hanson, 2003, Zuindeau and 113 
Ifresi, 2007) or finding a fair coverage threshold (Giné Garriga et al., 2012). But programs making use 114 
of these criteria have often failed to reach the poorest and/or most underdeveloped areas, and often end 115 
up targeting the most populated areas (De Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011, Andres et al., 2014). Not 116 
only do such programs exclude some of the targeted users without adequate water service, but they may 117 
also increase the gap between the poorest and, in rural Africa, generally the least densely populated 118 
areas, and the more developed ones. Water point (WP) maintenance is also impacted; in a high WP 119 
density context, the existence of alternative solutions may discourage collective mobilization to repair 120 
4 
 
a failing pump. On the other hand, high density can facilitate access to spare parts (Jiménez and Pérez-121 
Foguet, 2011, Foster, 2013). 122 
Relative universal fairness principles for water management can be identified, but the legitimacy of the 123 
process leading to the water allocation decision is often an important component of the perception of 124 
fairness itself (Syme et al., 1999). The procedural dimension deals with the fairness of the procedures 125 
by which a distributional decision area is defined. It relates to the issues of recognition, inclusion, 126 
representation and participation of the different stakeholders impacted by strategic management 127 
decisions and conflict resolution (Schlosberg, 2004, Paavola, 2004). Indeed, participation and 128 
empowerment concepts now prevail in most water-related guidelines, policies, and programs: for 129 
example, community participation in WP management is often presented as a key component of the pro-130 
poor dimension. But community-based management is now being criticized because the implementation 131 
process in itself often limits the transformative role of participation (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). 132 
Recent research points out that the link between empowerment and equity goes beyond providing a 133 
voice and a fair process; it is also about providing the users the opportunity and capacity to develop their 134 
abilities to make use of the allocation (Sen, 1992, McDermott et al., 2013, Venot and Clement, 2013). 135 
Environmental justice has thus a contextualized character that deals with the pre-existing conditions and 136 
power relations that facilitate or curtail people’s access to decision-making, resources and benefits. In 137 
other words, contextual equity addresses the structural and relational mechanisms that determine the 138 
equity of access to water (Ribot and Peluso, 2003), notably the technological choice and cost recovery 139 
mechanisms. In the water delivery sector, fairness must address the development as well as the 140 
functionality of the infrastructure needed to collect and distribute water. 141 
In practice, the three dimensions are closely related (Blaber-Wegg et al., 2015), but the perception of 142 
fairness varies among the different actors (Corbera et al., 2007). It is therefore necessary to clarify the 143 
origin and content of the narrative and discourse concerning equity claims, and the analysis of equity in 144 
the program must consider how equity is framed in the design of the program and how program 145 
execution handles the different components in practice. 146 
Traditionally, inequitable access to water in rural areas was explained by decision-making processes 147 
that favored economic or technical considerations and/or political bias (Yamano and Ohkawara, 2000, 148 
Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005, Albalate et al., 2012), as underlined in the allocation of WPs in 149 
Mozambique (Rosário and Guambe, 2015). Although most societies prioritize justice in the water sector 150 
(Syme et al., 1999, Roa-García, 2014), the prevailing political economy of water favors efficiency and/or 151 
productivity at the expense of equity in interventions and narratives (Venot and Clement, 2013, Roa-152 
García, 2014). Thus, privatizing water services is associated with inequity of access in both social and/or 153 
geographical terms (Smith and Hanson, 2003, Castro, 2007, Perreault, 2014). The call for equity in the 154 
rural water sector is viewed as a moral injunction, a requirement of international funding organizations 155 
and/or a political choice creating constraints for the intervention. In pro-poor rural water interventions, 156 
the failure to ensure “fair” spatial coverage has been mostly explained by shortcomings during the 157 
planning stage of the infrastructure development cycle, such as political bias (Andres et al., 2014), a 158 
disconnection between national and district level planning (De Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011) or lack 159 
of data or planning instruments (Giné Garriga et al., 2012). Our paper focuses on the importance of the 160 
other stages of the cycle, such its design and infrastructure development. 161 
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3.  Improved management procedures and enhanced participation 162 
to improve water coverage 163 
3.1 Water access in Mabalane district 164 
Mabalane is one of the five districts of the Gaza Province selected for the pilot stage of PRONASAR. 165 
The district is divided into three administrative posts (AP): Mabalane-Sede (42% of the population), 166 
Combumune (30% of the population) and Ntlavene (28% of the population), which are further divided 167 
into localities, including different villages (Figure 1). At each of the three levels (District, AP, and 168 
Locality), consultative councils (CCs) have to be involved in the process of elaboration and approval of 169 
the district plans and in the selection of projects for local government credit schemes. They bring 170 
together co-opted members from the state administration, organized civil society, village leaders and 171 
local economic elites. 172 
Seventy-two percent of the 5,400 families in the district subsist below the poverty line (Hussein and 173 
Castigo, 2012), but the poverty situation is worse in Combumune and Ntlavene APs (respectively 80% 174 
and 88% of the population) compared to Mabalane-Sede (55% of the population) (PEDD Mabalane, 175 
2010). The Shaangana populations traditionally extended along permanent water sources, but were 176 
grouped in villages as a result of the civil war and of the “villagization” policy in the post-independence 177 
years. Thus, two thirds of the population are now located in riverine villages along the Limpopo River, 178 
which also forms the border of the Limpopo National Park (LNP). The villages located west of the river 179 
are therefore part of the park buffer zone (Figure 1). Other villages established either during colonial 180 
times to support specific activities (animal breeding farms, train stations, etc.) or in recent decades for 181 
the exploitation of charcoal, are located more than 10 km from the river. Access to the villages is difficult 182 
due to the poor state of the roads, but the district is accessible by train. The two main settlements or vilas 183 
(Mabalane-Sede, the district center, and Combumune-Estação), which were originally station 184 
settlements, host the largest population of the district. 185 




There are no permanent bodies of water in the district; the Limpopo River only flows for 10 months of 188 
the year due to upstream abstraction, and its tributaries are intermittent. There are a few small reservoirs 189 
mostly along the beds of these tributaries, but they dry up after the rainy season. Information on 190 
groundwater resources refers to wells at the time of their construction and to geological information. 191 
Reports conclude that large-scale groundwater abstractions are very limited as a consequence of low 192 
productivity and poor water quality due to the high mineralization of the aquifers (CSIR, 2003, FAO, 193 
2004). The water table is generally deeper (between 50 m and 100 m) than in other areas of Mozambique 194 
(WE Consult, 2006). Most water infrastructure was destroyed during the civil war. Existing boreholes 195 
were built after the war and/or as flood or drought relief interventions by non-governmental 196 
organizations (NGOs) with the support of donors. Prior to PRONASAR, the district claimed to have 56 197 
boreholes, 15 SWS that pumped groundwater or river water with motor pumps, and 17 small temporary 198 
reservoirs (SDPI Mabalane, 2011). Although each NGO had its own strategy for community 199 
mobilization and borehole governance, most strategies included the creation of a water committee and 200 
the payment of a water fee. 201 
In terms of access to water, three main areas can be distinguished: (1) riverine villages located along the 202 
east bank of the river that have access to alluvial and river water; this zone can be subdivided into easily 203 
accessible villages in the southern and central part of the district, and more isolated villages in the 204 
northern part; (2) western riverine villages in the LNP buffer zone, with no direct access to the district 205 
except when the Limpopo River dries up (denoted “Buffer zone villages”); (3) villages located on the 206 
plateau that have no access to surface water (denoted “Plateau villages”). 207 
3.2 The pro-poor dimensions of the PRONASAR 208 
The main objective of PRONASAR, which was approved by Ministerial Decree No. 258/2010, was to 209 
reduce the spatial imbalance in the coverage of services in the provinces and districts of Mozambique 210 
through the implementation of the proposals outlined in the Strategic Plan for Rural Water and 211 
Sanitation (PENA-ASR) in the strategic pillars of the water sector defined in the five-year plans and in 212 
the action plan for the reduction of absolute poverty (PARPA, 2004, 2011). The program is covered by 213 
the framework of other legal instruments such as the National Water Policy of 1995, reviewed and 214 
updated in 2007, which emphasized the demand principle, decentralization, poverty alleviation, 215 
development of the institutional capacity of the community and integrated management of water and 216 
sanitation. The program also has a sanitation component that is not analyzed here. 217 
Concretely, the program focuses on improving the management component of water and sanitation 218 
procedures from the planning stage to the monitoring stage, including O&M of infrastructure at the 219 
community level. Districts are the focal points for planning, implementing, and monitoring the program, 220 
while the province is responsible for drawing up and managing contracts. Although community 221 
involvement, capacity-building and institutional development are emphasized, the program also strongly 222 
encourages the participation of the private sector. In Mabalane, the program planned to drill 30 boreholes 223 
and to restore seven SWS. The national norms that define the quality of service were changed prior to 224 
the launching of the program: in rural areas, adequate service is defined as a “protected dug well 225 
equipped with a hand pump, serving 300 people within a 500 meter radius (30 minute walking time back 226 
and forth including queuing time)”. Previously, the norm was around 500 people per WP. Legally, the 227 
electric conductivity of potable water should be limited to between 50 and 2,000 µS/cm (Ministerial 228 
Decree 180/2004), although an informal threshold of 2500 µS/cm was tolerated in the program (Pendly 229 
and Obiols, 2013). 230 
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The program explicitly promotes poverty alleviation, good governance and gender equity. The pro-poor 231 
approach includes the prioritization of districts and district areas with low coverage and a high poverty 232 
level assessed through indicators such as the incidence of poverty in the village, the percentage of water 233 
sources maintained by communities with pro-poor management rules and the percentage of poor areas 234 
and households with access to water and sanitation. Participation aims to facilitate the inclusion of the 235 
most vulnerable groups and women in decision-making, including in the planning stage. Other 236 
recommendations mention the need to use participatory district planning methods and to mobilize the 237 
different consultative councils, as well as to make use of traditional systems of social support to reach 238 
the most vulnerable groups. 239 
3.3 The functioning of PRONASAR 240 
The program was defined at the national level with the support of international consultants. This 241 
included the choice of pilot provinces, the dimensioning of the intervention, the main technical 242 
orientations and the indicators to monitor efficiency. Provincial technical services were responsible for 243 
the selection of target districts, financial management of the program, procurement, monitoring, and 244 
contracts. Implementation relied on contracts between the provincial administration and three private 245 
contractors per district (the drilling contractor, the drilling supervisor and the Participation and 246 
Community Education contractor (Portuguese acronym PEC). The district technical services 247 
(Portuguese acronym SDPI) were in charge of monitoring the progress of the intervention and of local 248 
coordination. Drilling contractors are only paid for successful boreholes that actually supply water, 249 
leading to higher costs in problematic area like Mabalane. Countrywide, a 100% success rate produces 250 
an 8% profit, while a success rate of below 80% may mean the contractor fails to make a profit and may 251 
even make a loss (WE Consult, 2006), but no reference exists for specific problematic areas. In 252 
Mabalane, the unit cost of a borehole was 77% higher than the Mozambican average (Zita and Naafs, 253 
2012). One drilling contract was cancelled after one year as the first contractor proved to be incompetent. 254 
The new contractor therefore only had two years to fulfill the original contract for 30 boreholes. The 255 
PEC contract was also delayed for reasons that remain unclear. 256 
Following emphasis on demand principles, the community selection procedure required the 257 
formalization of a demand by the communities that would show the community’s willingness and 258 
capacity to participate in cash or in kind, the formation of a water and sanitation committee, and payment 259 
of full operation and maintenance costs (MPOH/DNA, 2009). Selection was to be made on a “first come 260 
first served” basis. The PEC contractor was responsible for organizing community mobilization, 261 
formalizing the community requests and organizing the water committee. The community was expected 262 
to propose and clear three possible sites of their choice where the technical contractor could explore 263 
water availability. 264 
4. Methodology 265 
A three step approach was used. First, the institutional and normative framework of the program was 266 
characterized by examining program documents and interviewing key national, provincial, and district 267 
actors. At district level, the administrator, the district’s permanent secretary, some heads of 268 
administrative posts and locality, the heads of District Water, Planning, Social, and Agriculture Services, 269 
and some technicians from the District Water and Agriculture Services were interviewed. NGO 270 
technicians involved in water who could be traced were also interviewed in the second half of 2012. At 271 




PRONASAR data concerning WPs and the number of people per village at the district level were used 274 
after triangulation with a map of water points drawn by the University Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) in 275 
2012 in two APs (Mabalane and Combumune). This triangulation, combined with our field visits, 276 
revealed some inconsistencies in the names of villages, the conditions of WPs, the levels of salinity and 277 
the number of inhabitants per village1. Whenever possible, the errors concerning village names and 278 
inhabitants were corrected using our field data. 279 
Twelve communities (18.4% of all the villages in the area) in the three above-mentioned areas were 280 
selected for an investigation of water use, access to water, and community management of WPs. The 281 
villages were selected to include different types of Small Water Infrastructures (SWIs), including small-282 
scale irrigation in the seven localities of the district. This village level survey (one day per village) 283 
included: (i) an interview with each village leader (traditional and elected leaders), (ii) focus groups with 284 
people in charge of the management of WPs (whether a member of a formalized water committee or 285 
not), and (iii) a walk to visit all the village SWIs and water sources accompanied by the person/people 286 
in charge of their management. In two villages, we held a women’s focus group to understand variations 287 
in perceptions of the development and in the functioning of boreholes and access to water in general. 288 
The aim of this investigation was to clarify the history of the development and management of all water 289 
infrastructure (including motor-pumps), the problems encountered, and how the villagers interacted 290 
among themselves and with external actors in water interventions and management. Particular attention 291 
was paid to related tensions and how they were managed. The different contributions were triangulated 292 
to check the real responsibilities, tasks and activities of the actors around WPs. All the discussions were 293 
recorded and transcribed. They were held in Portuguese with translation into Shangaana when necessary. 294 
In the third step, we conducted a survey (n=119) in three riverine communities to understand water uses, 295 
the perception of borehole functioning and some aspects of equity perception by different wealth groups. 296 
Before the interview, the village leader was asked to allocate all the families of the village to four 297 
different wealth groups, from which 20% of the families were selected. 298 
5. Results 299 
5.1 Equity program design 300 
The program aims to improve the planning process in order to improve the sustainability of WPs by 301 
focusing on managerial aspects such as the cost-efficiency of execution, in order to improve 302 
coordination and the exchange of information between actors, to improve management procedures, and 303 
to better organize the spare part value chain and training. The equity of the program was framed by the 304 
points of view of international organizations and health aspects of the water supply, as well as on 305 
universal coverage and correction of the coverage gap (Goff and Crow, 2014). Thus, the program had 306 
both distributive and procedural equity content; improvement of the spatial coverage was to be achieved 307 
by rationalizing the increase in the number of WPs through a sound choice of districts and villages, and 308 
by encouraging the participation of the community in planning and management. Contextual aspects 309 
                                                     
1
 Two inconsistencies are noted in this study: (1) the names of two different sized villages were inversed in 
PRONASAR documents. We thus expected village E (Table 3) to be a large village with different SWIs, but it 
turned out to be the smallest village we visited. (2) Some settlements were not included in the PRONASAR list 
we used, and consequently the number of inhabitants per locality might be slightly underestimated in Table 1. 
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were limited to recommending non-motorized small-scale technologies that were perceived as being 310 
more appropriate, and letting villages choose their modes of payment. 311 
The program aimed to improve the previous allocation process, which was perceived as unfair by 312 
national actors and some provincial and district technicians. Previously, WP allocation resulted from the 313 
combination of ease of access and political interference in a context of top-down administrative 314 
functioning. The most accessible villages were over-exposed to visits by high level (provincial or 315 
national) politicians or representatives of donors who had little time to devote to each area visited. A 316 
vicious circle of investments in some communities at the expense of others emerged as the district 317 
government strived to fulfil the promises made during these visits. Existing investments justified further 318 
visits to “pilot” sites (source: interviews with the National MPOH agents, provincial INAS agents, 319 
provincial DPOH agents, SDPI agents and directors, NGO agents, communities, and mission reports). 320 
In this context, the choice of sites based on merit - in this case their wealth status - was viewed as a 321 
fairer process of allocation by national and provincial actors. 322 
The other procedural recommendations fell more within discursive justification given the limited 323 
attention paid to their implementation or the training agenda of the program. For example, participation 324 
through the mobilization of CCs and village water committees in planning and O&M was supposed to 325 
contribute to the empowerment of women and “vulnerable people”. The percentage of women in water 326 
committees was the only related criterion included in monitoring indicators of the PEC contract. 327 
Vulnerability was not defined; in national policies and in the collective understanding of national actors, 328 
it referred to people with disabilities or chronic diseases (notably HIV), and households headed by 329 
children or old people who are unlikely to be mobilized and interested in villages or district decision-330 
making bodies. 331 
5.2 Equity considerations during program implementation 332 
5.2.1 Handling district diversity 333 
They were no coherent stories of how the initial selection of districts had been made, but all the 334 
narratives emphasized that the initial selection of districts did not include the most distant and 335 
challenging districts in the province, and that a new selection was proposed; more challenging districts 336 
were then included in the portfolio, but a couple of accessible districts were purposely kept to be able to 337 
show results at the end of the pilot phase (source: interviews with the Provincial DPOH agents). 338 
Technicians explained that to be sure to achieve results of the externally funded projects within the 339 
(limited) timeframe specified by the projects, they were used to selecting areas, villages, or populations 340 
in which the chances of success were the highest. 341 
5.2.2 At the district level, conflicting perceptions of equity 342 
At the district level, the allocation of sites resulted from tradeoffs between efficiency and equity. The 343 
tradeoffs were embedded in the complex relationship between the district technical service, the 344 
supervising provincial technical service and the contractors. 345 
Although the overall coverage indicator decreased from an average of 936 to 487 persons per operational 346 
WP (Table 1), access to water in the district was still perceived as problematic since the coverage among 347 
APs was unequal. Some villages on the plateau and in the buffer zone had no WP, meaning the distance 348 
to be covered to access water could be high, even in riverine villages. Moreover, the average electric 349 
conductivity of 50% of the new boreholes was above the informal threshold of 2500 µS/cm (with an 350 
average of the 30 new WPs of 2,650 µS/cm). The “salinity” problem was particularly acute in two 351 
localities (Mabalane-Sede and Ntlavene). 352 
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Table 1: Changes in some water access indicators in Mabalane (for operational water points) before and after the 353 
project 354 
  355 
There were two conflicting distributive equity strategies at the district level. Immediately prior to 356 
PRONASAR, the district government strived to promote more balanced development by reallocating 357 
interventions by NGOs or external organizations to the underdeveloped areas of the district, notably in 358 
the LNP buffer zone (source: district government interviews and documents). But administrative 359 
allocation of benefits normally followed “equality” rules; for example, the quantity of seeds offered by 360 
the government as part of the post-flood relief intervention of 2013 was equally divided in each AP, 361 
locality and village. Criteria such as the number of households per village or the impact of the flood 362 
were not taken into account. 363 
Originally, the district government decided to allocate an equal number of boreholes (10) to each AP. 364 
Consultative councils (CCs) at the AP level were in charge of selecting the village, which was done 365 
according to needs (source: minutes of CC meetings, leaders interviews). But in many selected villages, 366 
electric conductivity was above 2500 µS/cm. First, the technicians decided to increase this threshold to 367 
5000 µS/cm. In interviews, this decision was justified by pressure from the population to get WPs, even 368 
if the water was “saline”, but other parameters, such as finalizing the contract, may also have interfered. 369 
As the end of the contract was approaching, the technicians and district government decided to focus on 370 
the plateau area of Combumune AP, where “non-saline” groundwater had proved easier to find. The 371 
communities or councils were not consulted in this second stage of the process. It was a desktop decision, 372 
and involved SDPI, the district government, and the contractors at the most, that were under pressure 373 
because of the drilling contractor’s schedule. It is not even clear to what extent the decision was 374 
collective; the drilling contractor might have purposely rejected villages with a greater likelihood of 375 
failure. In some villages, only one site was explored and the contractor never returned for further 376 
investigation as he had promised. While some distant villages received only one visit from the contractor, 377 
closer villages were visited several times, sometimes until a satisfactory site was found. On the other 378 
hand, the few villages whose leaders had submitted a formal complaint to the district service were more 379 
likely to be visited again, thereby highlighting the role of the local government in the decision. Although 380 
the contractor was asked to slow down to give the technical services and PEC contractors time to identify 381 
communities, the firm, which benefited from high level support, stuck to its own agenda and timing. 382 
11 
 
Contextual equity played a limited role; the ability of the leader to connect with the administration 383 
interfered in village selection. But district-level actors were also sensitive to the political voice of 384 
population; for example, district services claimed the population of Combumune Vila was particularly 385 
vocal, which, in the past, had led to bias in their favor when food subsidies were allocated (interviews 386 
with the INAS provincial agents, SDAE agents, district government). Although the Vila was favored in 387 
the program, with the help of the district government they managed to secure a SWS through another 388 
source of external funding immediately after the program. Local technicians expressed doubts 389 
concerning the appropriateness of boreholes in the hydrogeological context of the district and submitted 390 
a request to include small reservoirs associated with SWS in the program; the planning procedure and 391 
contractual organization of the program did not permit this change, and the request was denied. 392 
Not surprisingly, equity considerations played no role in the contractors work. Both PEC and drilling 393 
contractors’ work was late for different reasons, and there was only limited coordination between them 394 
- a requirement of the program – as each focused on his own agenda. In particular, the drilling contractor 395 
wanted to finish the job as quickly as possible to free up the equipment for other contractual 396 
engagements outside Mabalane (source: provincial and district technical agents, district government). 397 
In any case, many villages were not informed they had been selected, and the community consequently 398 
had no time to agree on possible sites. The procedure used for the selection of the villages and sites 399 
rendered the demand-driven approach irrelevant. Although communities formalized their involvement 400 
with a letter of request, in most cases the letters were only regularized after drilling was completed. The 401 
community request, which was considered to be a key condition for sustainability in SDA, turned out to 402 
be a mere administrative and bureaucratic step. 403 
Thus, the partial spatial adjustments made between areas were more the result of interactions between 404 
the district government and contractors than of a deliberate choice to tackle geographic disparity (Table 405 
1). There was an increase in coverage indicators in the villages located in the northern part of the district 406 
(Combomune AP) where 50% of the new boreholes were drilled, but villages in the buffer zone were 407 
still less well served than other villages. 408 
Although the 52% increase in the number of functioning WPs was an achievement praised by many 409 
actors in the district, the limited consideration given to procedural equity resulted in frustration, 410 
misunderstandings, and tensions. These concerned disagreement about the drilling sites, the decision 411 
not to equip positive but “saline” boreholes, and the types of equipment used (Table 2). 412 
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Table 2: The different types of tensions around water in the Mabalane district mentioned during fieldwork 413 
Not directly related to PRONASAR Directly related to PRONASAR 
Contract failure (for water infrastructure) (1)  
Choice of technology (1) 
Water tariffs in Vila (1) 
Competition over water access in the case of pump 
failure or of poor yield (3) 
Competition with animals in access to water in the 
Plateau area (1) 
Competition with non-local users of a reservoir (1) 
Transparency between NGOs and communities in 
the management of funds for repair (2) 
Transparency in water fund management – related 
to leadership conflict (2) 
Contract failure (for water infrastructure) (2) 
Choice of technology (2) 
PEC contractor’s recommendations for a water tariff 
(1) 
Disagreement over the location of boreholes (6 
mentioned / 4 official complaints reported) 
Saline boreholes not finalized (2) 
Lack of communication between the contractor and 
the leader (3) 
Access to borehole limited while the boreholes were 
not fenced (1) 
 
Numbers in parentheses are the number of specific cases mentioned. 414 
5.3 Community level equity 415 
5.3.1 Equity considerations of the program at the community level 416 
Equity considerations directly linked to community functioning were not fully explicit in the program. 417 
They were embedded in four elements that were also considered determining factors for borehole 418 
maintenance: the need for a water committee to manage the water fees and maintain the hand pump, the 419 
participation of women in these committees, the mode of payment defined by the community itself and 420 
the creation of a district fund to cover maintenance when it proved to be beyond the community’s 421 
capacity. In practice, the PEC contractors focused only on the formalization of the water committees, 422 
the number of women involved and the definition of a monthly water fee, whose amount was specified 423 
by the community. 424 
A strong equality norm prevailed at the village level. Most people rejected technologies or interventions 425 
that favored some over others. On a list of 18 options, 39% of our interviewees rejected the option 426 
focused on the rehabilitation of small reservoirs, arguing it favored only the (richer) cattle owners. 427 
Options that were associated with a limited number of beneficiaries were also more likely to be rejected 428 
as being potentially conflictual. 429 
Transparency issues in the allocation of external benefits (whether or not linked to water) were also 430 
associated with internal tensions. Leaders often played the role of gatekeeper in the community, 431 
controlling community members’ access to the benefits of external interventions. Thus, the group with 432 
the highest income of the four wealth groups (WG4) in a community was more likely to receive post-433 
flood subsidies than the other groups, although the bias varied among villages (Figure 2). In some 434 
villages, information concerning external interventions - especially those that provided direct economic 435 
benefits - did not seem to have circulated outside the circle of the leaders’ advisors. 436 
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Figure 2: Number of subsidies received by families in three villages after the 2013 flood event, in the four wealth groups 437 
(WGs). 438 
 439 
A monthly water fee followed community preference for equal treatment, but leadership interviews 440 
underlined that in some villages, a social fee benefited older people without family support. In any case, 441 
the poorest wealth group (WG1) paid their water fees later than the other groups, but nonetheless 442 
continued to have access to village hand pumps; 40% of the poorest wealth group had paid water fees 443 
in the two months preceding the interview, while more than 59% had in the three other wealth groups. 444 
In contrast, the assumption concerning the role of the water committee did not match their real role. In 445 
practice, leaders played a strategic role in mobilizing complementary funds above the amount collected 446 
by the committee and decided on major repairs, while the “committees” were only used to collect and 447 
hold water fees, and occasionally to undertake small local repairs. 448 
5.3.2 The impact of some equity aspects of the program at the village level 449 
“Saline” boreholes as sources of water were the subjects of debate, but actors did not acknowledge the 450 
impact of electric conductivity on human health and maintenance costs, as well as its equity dimensions. 451 
When they depended on a single saline borehole, users who could afford the cost of transport and who 452 
also had the time preferred to fetch drinking water from the river. As poverty in the area is mainly linked 453 
to workforce availability (FEWSNET, 2012), 88% and 90% of two lowest wealth groups relied only on 454 
boreholes, whereas the percentage was respectively 82% and 73% for WG3 and WG4, the two richer 455 
groups, despite the water fees. 456 
The level of salinity also impacted maintenance: when the quality of the water was poor and/or an 457 
alternative source of reasonable quality was available within walking distance, a leader might have 458 
difficulty mobilizing the community for the necessary complementary funding for maintenance (Table 459 
3). This was all the more difficult when the leader’s legitimacy was contested. Occasionally conflicts 460 
degenerated and ended in vandalism of the water infrastructure. As water is considered a public good 461 
and is a vital need in this semi-arid area, some communities were able to overcome the tensions and 462 
carry out the necessary repairs. But in other villages, local tensions directly impacted the ability of the 463 
leader to mobilize the community to undertake repairs. 464 
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Table 3: Information on access to water in the 12 communities surveyed 465 
 466 
6. Discussion 467 
6.1 Fairness issues have a direct impact on the outcomes of the program 468 
It is now acknowledged that universal access to water has been achieved at the expense of sustainability 469 
(Foster, 2013) and project approaches to water access have been accused of bias toward the construction 470 
of infrastructure at the expense of its long-term management and maintenance. Yet, there has been little 471 
improvement in long-term maintenance with SDA. This failure has been explained by the technical and 472 
managerial shortcomings of these programs (De Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011), the availability of 473 
an alternative source of access to water (Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet, 2011, Koehler et al., 2015) or the 474 
inadequate model of committee-based management imposed on communities (Harvey and Reed, 2007). 475 
The maintenance of the new boreholes in the Mabalane district was indeed affected by these different 476 
issues. But defective maintenance is also the consequence of (in)equity issues; these issues increased 477 
internal tensions in the communities, and ultimately affected the ability for collective action, on which 478 
maintenance relies. This risk emerged even in a context in which communities did not question their 479 
responsibility for WP management, refuting the premises of SDA, in which explicit community demand 480 
and community involvement is supposed to guarantee maintenance. It calls for a carefully crafted entry 481 
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strategy in a community that goes beyond favoring local institutions or externally created ones, and 482 
takes care to respect the preoccupations of the community fairly to avoid deepening existing tensions 483 
and affecting trust. 484 
Although being ‘pro-poor’ was an explicit dimension of PRONASAR, the improvement of water access 485 
was mainly tackled by improving the management of the different stages of the infrastructure 486 
development cycle. The contractual basis of the program such as payment based on successful boreholes 487 
or contract duration created a bias toward efficiency, which ultimately led to equity issues being ignored. 488 
It favored the contractor’s agenda since the contracting and/or supervising authority did not have the 489 
means to impose its own terms. The efficiency bias might have been reinforced locally by political 490 
considerations, although political favoritism was not apparent, probably because the district as a whole 491 
strongly supported the party in power. It would account for why the district government was so willing 492 
to complete the contract despite the hydrogeological constraints. But pragmatic considerations might 493 
also have played a role, since the central design of the program and the contractual dimension of 494 
implementation provided little scope for adaptation to local specificities. 495 
6.2 The ambiguity of equity in rural water and sanitation programs 496 
Calling for better integration of equity in this program implies getting rid of the ambiguities associated 497 
with its definition. Different criteria of distributive and procedural justice were mobilized in both 498 
discourse and in practice during the design, planning and execution of the program. They reflect the 499 
points of view of the different actors engaged in the different stages, and highlight the ambiguities and 500 
incoherence of pro-poor policies. The program recommendation focused on allocation according to 501 
merit – in this case the poorest – selected by technicians according to previously (and externally) defined 502 
indicators. Yet, it has already been shown that selecting communities using poverty indicators is not 503 
very effective because the necessary information is not available or because of coordination issues 504 
between planning cycles (De Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011, Giné Garriga et al., 2012). While the 505 
district government originally aimed to correct existing spatial inequalities – a distributive dimension – 506 
it finally combined equal allocation and took care of procedural justice by mobilizing the legitimate 507 
instance of consultation for decision-making for the specific allocation. 508 
All the actors involved had a sense of fairness, but they defined it differently. It is well known that the 509 
concept of “fairness” can be applied differently at the universal and situational levels (Perreault, 2014, 510 
Joy et al., 2014, Syme et al., 1999) but in this particular case, there was also a difference due to the 511 
different perceptions of fairness at the different stages of the program, among national executives, 512 
district authorities and communities. Even if a community favored equal sharing of cost or outputs 513 
between families, they could mobilize mechanisms in favor of the most vulnerable individuals, 514 
according to their definition of vulnerability. This argues for the development of a method that would 515 
enable the different perceptions of justice to be comprehended and incorporated at the beginning of the 516 
program, including possible conflict between general principles and the principles actually applied. In 517 
such an approach, the involvement of CCs in the definition of the program should not have been used 518 
as a means of appropriation, but rather as a pre-condition to clarify the different perspectives around 519 
equity and to find ways to conciliate and/or negotiate them. 520 
6.3 Overcoming the challenges of equitable access to water in the local 521 
context 522 
Procedural justice is all the more important when distributive spatial equity, i.e., equal access to water 523 
at the territorial level, is difficult to achieve. This is the case in many rural African areas because of the 524 
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distribution of the population, the environmental constraints or the different criteria on which 525 
distributive equity can be assessed. The preferred criteria of equal access per village (or leader) do not 526 
guarantee equal access per family given the variability of village size, but are coherent with the way 527 
local politics and governance function. 528 
In the local hydrogeological context, equal access could only be achieved by using different technologies 529 
such as motorized SWS pumps in small reservoirs or expanded use of rainwater harvesting. But these 530 
technologies are associated with contextual equity issues; costs, possible multiple uses, or access rights 531 
might favor some users at the expense of others. These biases are rarely acknowledged as such; multiple-532 
use water supply systems are often presented as inherently pro-poor (Renwick et al., 2007). In SDA, 533 
contextual equity is often restricted to the recommendations concerning the choice of technology, but 534 
the concept of appropriate technology overlooks other aspects such as heterogeneity of rural 535 
communities. Vertical equity, i.e. the conditions of access to water services depending on the capabilities 536 
of users, was not taken into consideration, but there are indications that it is being taken into account in 537 
the villages. The different equity issues raised by technologies need to be tackled openly with the 538 
community and decision makers to find local solutions or compensation to minimize frustrations. 539 
7. Conclusion 540 
The program explicitly claimed to take equity into account. In practice, it focused on one aspect of 541 
distributive equity (spatial coverage) and limited aspects of procedural equity (women’s participation in 542 
O&M and the involvement of representatives of water users in minor aspects of planning). By focusing 543 
on management and planning, it assumed that the failure of previous approaches in achieving its 544 
objectives, including good spatial coverage and long-term maintenance of SWI, was due to managerial 545 
deficiencies; yet, our analysis underlines the fact that achieving equitable water access goes beyond 546 
improving decision-making and planning. In particular, the managerial focus did not accommodate the 547 
need to negotiate the perceptions of equity in water access of the different actors who interacted during 548 
the implementation process. Moreover, even if managers and water users’ representatives shared a 549 
preoccupation for distributive equity, this dimension proved difficult to achieve in the contextualized 550 
situation of the district. Technical or managerial improvement such as systematic hydrogeological 551 
investigation or better coordination between contractors could have minimized some of the problems 552 
encountered. But correcting the spatial disparities in water access requires going beyond the managerial 553 
and technical focus of SDA. It calls for a careful definition of equity during the design of a water 554 
program, taking into account its different dimensions, the local perceptions of how water justice can be 555 
achieved and aligning the equity recommendations in the different stages of the program cycle. With 556 
this objective in mind, the early mobilization of participatory bodies is not only a way to tackle 557 
procedural justice, but is also a precondition to better negotiate the conflicting equity considerations. 558 
This is all the more important since decision makers tend to consider equity as a political injunction to 559 
be weighed against efficiency objectives. There were indications that issues of unfairness could directly 560 
impact the engagement of local actors in O&M, which remains the main challenge in rural water access. 561 
The relationships between these two aspects should be more systematically explored to overcome the 562 
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